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CONFRONTING RELIGION:




On October 11, 2006, Ginnnah Muhammad appeared in Michi-
gan small claims court before District Judge Paul J. Paruk in her suit
against Enterprise Rent-A-Car.' Muhammad is a practicing Muslim
who wears the niqib (hereinafter "veil"), which covers every part of
her face except her eyes.2 The judge asked Muhammad to remove
the veil prior to testifying so that he could gauge her reliability and
credibility.3 She refused on religious grounds and Judge Paruk ulti-
mately gave her a choice: remove the veil and continue testifying or
continue to refuse and risk having her suit dismissed.4 Muhammad
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.A. Philosophy
and Political Science, Villanova University, 2008. Many thanks to Professor Richard
Garnett for his guidance and assistance in the planning stages of this Note, the
members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their diligent editing, and Alex Hermanny,
Meghan Sweeney, and Michael Murray for their comments and suggestions. I would
also like to extend a heartfelt thank you to my family, especially my parents and
brothers, and Katherine Bering, for their continuous love, patience, support, and
encouragement.
1 Transcript of Small Claims Hearing at 1, Muhammad v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, No.
06-41896 (Mich. Dist. Ct. Oct. 11, 2006).
2 For information on the niqdb (or nikab), see generally Eli Sanders, Interpreting
Veils: Meanings Have Changed with Politics, History, SEATrLE TIMEs, Oct. 5, 2001, at El
(explaining the significance of the veil to the Islamic culture); BBC, Religions-Islam:
Niqab, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/niqab_I.shtml (last
visited Mar. 31, 2010).
3 Transcript of Small Claims Hearing, supra note 1, at 3-4 ("The Court: 'One of
the things that I need to do as I am listening to testimony is I need to see your face
and I need to see what's going on and unless you take that off, I can't see your face
and I can't tell whether you're telling me the truth or not and I can't see certain
things about your demeanor and temperament that I need to see in a court of
law ... ).
4 Id. at 5-6 ("The Court: 'So you have a couple of options today .... You can
either take it off and you can give me the testimony and after the hearing is all done
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chose the latter option and her suit was ultimately dismissed.5 In
effect, Muhammad lost her day in court because of her desire to prac-
tice an aspect of her religion. This past summer, partially in response,
the Michigan Judges Association and Michigan DistrictJudges Associa-
tion adopted a new statewide rule "giving judges 'reasonable' control
over the appearance of parties and witnesses to observe their
demeanor and ensure they can be accurately identified."6
Now imagine a similar situation in the criminal context: A lead
prosecutor decides that the key witness is a Muslim woman, who hap-
pens to wear a veil, and he needs her to testify against the criminal
defendant. The witness will appear in the courtroom before the
judge, jury, and each side. But the Muslim believes, as Muhammad
does, that removing her veil is a burden on her religious practice,
offensive to her dignity, and an infringement of her Free Exercise
rights under the First Amendment. She refuses to remove the veil but
is willing to give her testimony while her face is covered. Defense
counsel immediately cites the Sixth Amendment, quoting, "In all crim-
inal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him . . . ."
Defense counsel claims that the defendant's general right to con-
front witnesses includes a face-to-face meeting in which the finder of
fact is given ample opportunity to judge the credibility and reliability
of the witness.8 Meanwhile, the Muslim witness argues that she is enti-
tled to an exemption from general court procedures concerning wit-
ness attire due to the protections of the Free Exercise Clause in the
First Amendment. The government is caught in the middle because it
has an interest in upholding both constitutional rights. Protecting
religious freedom seems just as important as ensuring that criminal
defendants receive a fair trial, especially given the explicit guarantees
of both the First and Sixth Amendments.
The above hypothetical scenario has not occurred in any criminal
case to date. However, in a post-9/11 world this scenario is certainly
and over with and if you want to put it back on, I don't have any problems with that
but if, in fact, you do not wish to do it, then I cannot go forward with your case and I
have to dismiss your case.'").
5 Id. at 6 ("Ginnnah Muhammad: 'I wish to respect my religion and so I will not
take off my clothes.'").
6 Associated Press, New Rule Allows Michigan judges to Control Witnesses'Dress, FrsT
AMENDMENT CTR., July 18, 2009, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id
=21717.
7 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (emphasis added).




foreseeable given the heightened awareness of the place of Muslims in
American society and an increasing interest in the intersection of
religious practice and the law. This is especially true considering the
increase in the number of U.S. residents that identify as Muslims.9 In
such a situation, which constitutional right takes precedence? Is the
liberty interest found in the Free Exercise Clause stronger than that
found in the Confrontation Clause? Does the government have a
stronger interest in the protection of either right and should the gov-
ernment take sides in such a conflict? Does current Supreme Court
jurisprudence, concerning both clauses, provide an adequate solution
to this problem? Is it possible to have a workable resolution of a con-
flict between two fundamental constitutional rights, grounded in both
the history and text of the Constitution? These are the issues underly-
ing the threshold question that this Note will address and attempt to
answer: whether a Muslim witness must unveil while on the witness
stand in a criminal trial. It seeks to elucidate future discussions about
this topic.
Part I acknowledges the various interests held by the witness, the
defendant, and the State. Part II discusses current doctrine regarding
the Confrontation Clause as well as religious exemptions analysis
under the Free Exercise Clause. Part III demonstrates why the witness
could plausibly argue for an exemption given current doctrine for
both constitutional provisions. Part IV recognizes the potential
problems with granting such an exemption. Finally, this Note pro-
poses two possible solutions to the constitutional conflict and analyzes
each solution's shortcomings.
I. STRONG AND SEEMINGLY IRRECONCILABLE INTERESTS
One of the major difficulties with the above scenario is that it
implicates various constitutional interests. Indeed, deciding whether
to grant a religious exemption to a witness in a criminal case has
ramifications for the witness, the criminal defendant, and the state.
Thus, this Part explicates the numerous interests competing for
attention.
9 More Muslims are coming to the United States than at any time in the last two
decades. Andrea Elliott, More Muslims Are Coming to U.S. After a Decline in Wake of 9/11,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 2006, at 1; see also Associated Press, Federal Court Dismisses Muslim
Woman's Suit Against Michigan judge, FIRsT AMENDMENT CTR., May 15, 2008, http://
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=20059 ("'One could easily see the ...
continuous litigants that are going to step into district court with this (veil) on ....
This issue is going to come up over and over again.'" (first alteration in original)
(quoting Nabih Ayad, Ginnnah Muhammad's attorney)).
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A. The Criminal Defendant
Criminal trials revolve around the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. The trial determines whether the liberty that the defen-
dant enjoys to act as a normal citizen will cease to exist in the future.10
The potential loss of liberty warrants granting individuals a right to
defend themselves." This concern is the rationale for affording the
accused certain constitutional safeguards with the intent of establish-
ing a fair trial. Indeed, nearly the entire Bill of Rights-and especially
the Sixth Amendment-reflects the need to take these principles seri-
ously in a free and democratic society.12
A criminal defendant has two explicit constitutional interests in
the above case. First, and more broadly, he is entitled to a fair trial.13
The government must meet its burden through lawful procedures in
order to convict, including court procedures that protect a number of
individual constitutional rights.14 Second, and more specifically, every
criminal defendant is guaranteed the opportunity to "be confronted
10 Ted Chiricos et al., The Labeling of Convicted Felons and Its Consequences for Recidi-
vism, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 547, 548 (2007) ("The label of 'convicted felon' strips an indi-
vidual of the right to vote, serve on juries, own firearms, or hold public office.").
11 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presump-
tion of Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1228 (2006)
("Given the significance of [the consequences of criminal conviction], our society has
made 'a ftndamental value determination ... that it is far worse to convict an inno-
cent man than to let a guilty man go free.'" (second alteration in original) (quoting
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
12 Individuals must be able to defend themselves against the power of the state in
a liberal democratic society. Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and
Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 384-87 (1959); see also Daniel Shaviro, The Confrontation
Clause Today in Light of Its Common Law Background, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 337, 340-47
(1991) (discussing the common law development of modern trial procedures sympa-
thetic to individual rights). Sir Walter Raleigh, in the closing statement during his
trial, "warned the jury that none of them was safe if one could be convicted of treason
'by suspicions and presumptions ... without the open testimony of a single witness.'"
Id. at 343 (alteration in original) (quoting DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 442
(1832)). Professor Shaviro also notes that affording rights to the accused was a
response to "improper behavior by the State . . . used to convict the innocent or the
guilty." Id. at 344.
13 See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
14 The prosecution must comply with a number of procedures outlined in the
Constitution, see id. amends. IV, VII, and subsequently interpreted by the Supreme
Court. See generally A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MIcH.
L. REV. 249 (1968) (describing the Warren Court's contributions to the development
of constitutional criminal procedure). The applicability of such procedures remains a
developing area of the law.
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with" the individuals that will testify against him.15 The Supreme
Court has held that the Confrontation Clause affords defendants a
strong preference for face-to-face confrontations. 16 These constitu-
tional safeguards and protections are ancillary to significant intangi-
ble interests, such as the maintenance of one's good reputation and
avoidance of social stigma attached to one's name as a result of a crim-
inal conviction.1 7
B. The Muslim Witness
Like any religious believer entitled to protection under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Muslim witness has a
strong claim that her religious freedom should be protected. She can
claim that wearing the veil is an expression of religious belief,'s and
that removing it to reveal her face would burden her free exercise
because it would force her to choose between following the law and
following the dictates of her religion.' 9 And she is not without ample
support for this position: the text of the First Amendment, numerous
Supreme Court decisions describing the nature of burdens and grant-
ing exemptions, and a comprehensive history and tradition of relig-
ious accommodation in the United States provide strong legal
justification for taking her position very seriously. 20 Furthermore, the
15 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The text of the Sixth Amendment includes the word
"confront," even if its application may apply differently in certain factual scenarios.
16 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990); accord Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 63 (1980). But see Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 1021-22 (1988) (holding that
allowing witnesses to testify behind a screen that prevented them from viewing the
defendant while they testified violated the defendant's right to confrontation). For
discussion of several important Confrontation Clause cases, see infra Part II.A.
17 See Lemos, supra note 11, at 1228.
18 THE MUSLIM VEIL IN NORTH AMERICA 115-16 (Sajida Sultana Alvi et al. eds.,
2003) [hereinafter THE MUSLIM VEIL].
19 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) (characterizing a burden on
free exercise as forcing a choice between complying with the law and exercising relig-
ious belief); see also Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 171, 199 (1995) (describing pre-Smith bur-
dens as direct and coercive restrictions on religious practice, belief, and custom).
20 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 115-29 (2008). Professor
Nussbaum credits American toleration for religious difference as essential to civil
peace:
[S]ome credit for the absence of violence is due to the very tradition that I
have been describing, a tradition that regards religious conscience as pre-
cious and worthy of respect, and worthy of respect even when it enjoins con-
duct that refuses assimilation. If people want to wear religious articles of
dress, that has been their right ever since the Quakers and the Mennonites
and the Jews dressed strangely. If they seek accommodations from general
20101 1731
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witness may also have a protectable privacy interest in wearing her
veil. 21 Finally, her refusal to remove the veil has drastic implications
for her access to courts in both the criminal and civil contexts, thereby
impacting her ability to participate as a citizen.22
C. The State
The situation is unique for the State because it has strong inter-
ests on each side. The integrity of the criminal justice system, which
includes its ability to procure truth and justice as well as protect the
rights of individuals, is at stake. The State is interested in ensuring
that the criminal justice system is reliable and credible.23 The State
must also adhere to the procedural guarantees outlined in the Consti-
tution. At the same time, the State maintains a strong interest in pro-
tecting religious freedom, especially given the considerable history of
religious accommodation in America.24 Further, the State might con-
sider crafting public policies cognizant of non-Western traditions
given the pluralistic composition of the United States.25
The tension between these interests is ripe for analysis because it
involves the interplay of the Constitution and its textual guarantees,
laws on a religious basis, that again has been seen to be their right ever since
Jews were exempted from testifying on their Sabbath and Quakers from tak-
ing off their hats in court.
Id. at 347-48; see infra notes 56-59.
21 See Peninna Oren, Note, Veiled Muslim Women and Driver's License Photos: A Con-
stitutional Analysis, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 855, 878 (2005).
22 Wearing the veil resulted in Muhammad's inability to bring claims or testify in
the pursuit of justice, thereby precluding participation in certain civic opportunities
afforded to other citizens solely on the basis of religious practice. See Claire
McCusker, Comment, When Church and State Collide: Averting Democratic Disaffection in a
Post-Smith World, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 391, 392 (2007) ("[T]hese conflicts risk
causing religious organizations and people to opt out of public life, thereby threaten-
ing democratic participation.").
23 The U.S. Supreme Court has described the jury's ability to make credibility
determinations as "[a] fundamental premise of our criminal trial system." United
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998).
24 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 20, at 115-29; see also 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional
Law § 443 (2009) ("The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment constitutes an
absolute prohibition against governmental regulation of religious beliefs. Thus, the
Supreme Court has said that freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such
religious organization or form of worship as an individual may choose cannot be
restricted by law." (footnote omitted)).
25 THE MUSLIM VEIL, supra note 18, at xiii ("Widespread incidents (in the wider
Western society] often convince even more Muslims of the hypocrisy of the Western
world concerning freedom of expression and individual liberty, further poisoning the
relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims.").
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Supreme Court jurisprudence, history and traditions, public policy,
and the legitimate boundaries of religious practice in a society gov-
erned by the rule of law. The question is whether a careful balancing
of the interests may occur so as to minimize encroachment on these
respective interests or whether a tragic choice must be made. 26
II. HISTORICAL VALUES AND CURRENT
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
It is crucial to understand the historical underpinnings of each
constitutional protection as well as current understandings of their
meaning and scope in order to determine a possible resolution to the
conflict. Any workable solution must account for the current state of
the law.
A. The Confrontation Clause: From Absolute to Preferential Right
Underlying many decisions concerning the Confrontation Clause
is a concern for fundamental fairness, reflected through a desire for
adequate truth-seeking processes that are both reliable and credible:
"[T]he central mission of the Confrontation Clause ... is 'to advance
a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process
in criminal trials by assuring that the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory
basis for evaluating the truth of the [testimony].' "27
In Mattox v. United States,28 the Supreme Court highlighted the
central concerns of the Confrontation Clause: fairness and the relia-
bility of testimony. 29 At the same time, however, it left the door open
for exceptions to the general right of confrontation for public policy
reasons and the necessities of a particular case.30 The Court also has
linked the confrontation right to cross-examination throughout the
26 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES: THE CON-
FLICTS SOCIETY CONFRONTS IN THE ALLOCATION OF TRAGICALLY SCARCE RESOURCES
(1978) (arguing that society allocates scarce resources by prioritizing certain values
and outcomes).
27 Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 548 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (third alter-
ation in original) (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).
28 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
29 See id. at 242-43 (finding that the Confrontation Clause's primary function is
to ensure the reliability of evidence presented at criminal trials through adversarial
testing).
30 See id. at 258 (Shiras, J., dissenting) ("The books disclose many instances in
which rules of evidence, much more fundamental and time-honored than the one we
are treating, have been dispensed with, because of an overruling necessity. ... Neces-
sity, either physical or moral, dispenses with the ordinary rules of evidence.").
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twentieth century.3' Almost a century after Mattox, the Supreme
Court held in Coy v. Iowa 2 that the Clause guaranteed a literal right to
confrontation. The opinion, written by Justice Scalia, utilized literal
textualism and pointed to anecdotal history, human values, and prece-
dent for support.33 The case involved a state statute that allowed child
abuse victims to sit behind a screen while testifying in order to avoid
making eye contact with the defendant.34 The Court held that the
Clause guarantees a face-to-face meeting with witnesses and effective
cross-examination.35 Fundamental notions of fairness and the impor-
tance of reliable evidence established the literal right of confronta-
tion.3 6 Quoting Lee v. Illinois,37 Justice Scalia wrote how the right of
confrontation "'contributes to the establishment of a system of crimi-
nal justice in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness
prevails."' 38 The integrity of the trial process, including its fairness,
reliability, and credibility, favor providing defendants with the right to
confront witnesses. Affording defendants this right is not without
costs either: "[T]hat face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset
the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may
confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a
malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have
costs."39 Interestingly, Justice Scalia did acknowledge that exceptions
could exist; however, he noted that they "would surely be allowed only
when necessary to further an important public policy."40
31 SeeJacqueline Miller Beckett, Note, The True Value of the Confrontation Clause: A
Study of Child Sex Abuse Trials, 82 GEO. L.J. 1605, 1619 (1994).
32 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
33 See id, at 1017-21.
34 Id. at 1014-15.
35 See id. at 1017 ("[W]e have described the 'literal right to confront the witness
at the time of trial' as forming 'the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation
Clause.'" (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970))).
36 Justice Scalia pointed to President Eisenhower's remarks that meeting one's
accusers face-to-face was an unspoken rule in his hometown:
In Abilene, he said, it was necessary to "[m]eet anyone face to face with
whom you disagree. You could not sneak up on him from behind, or do any
damage to him, without suffering the penalty of an outraged citizenry....
In this country [sic], if someone dislikes you, or accuses you, he must come
up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow."
Id. at 1017-18 (alterations in original) (quoting Press Release, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower's Remarks at B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League (Nov. 23, 1951),
reprinted in Pollitt, supra note 12, at 381).
37 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
38 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019 (quoting Lee, 476 U.S. at 540).
39 Id. at 1020.
40 Id. at 1021.
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The concurring and dissenting opinions highlighted the Clause's
preferential nature. In concurrence, Justice O'Connor noted that the
Court had stated on numerous occasions that the Clause "'reflects a
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial' "41 and pointed to pre-
cedent to demonstrate that significant state interests could overcome
the general confrontation right.42 In dissent, Justice Blackmun
agreed with this general proposition and emphasized how the screen
did not preclude achievement of the guarantees of fairness and relia-
bility because the jury could view the demeanor of the witnesses and
defense counsel could engage in cross-examination.43 Each acknowl-
edged that protecting child abuse victims from "fear and trauma"
could amount to a significant public policy interest, as determined by
the legislature, to overcome the preferential right.44
Two years following Coy, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in
Maryland v. Craig,4 5 which also involved sexual abuse victims, and held
that the Clause only "'reflects a preference for face-to-face confronta-
tion at trial.' "46 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, affirmed
that the fundamental purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to
ensure reliability in testimony.47 Nevertheless, face-to-face confronta-
tion is "not the sine qua non of the confrontation right."48 Most signifi-
cantly for the purposes of this Note, the opinion held that the
Confrontation Clause "may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face con-
41 Id. at 1024 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
63 (1980)).
42 Id. at 1024-25. Justice O'Connor quoted, among other cases, Chambers v. Mis-
sissippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), in which the Court held that "the right to confront. .. is
not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate
interests in the criminal trial process." Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295, quoted in Coy, 487
U.S. at 1024 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
43 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1033-34 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) ("Because the girls testified
under oath, in full view of the jury, and were subjected to unrestricted cross-examina-
tion, there can be no argument that their testimony lacked sufficient indicia of
reliability.").
44 Id. at 1032 ("[T]he fear and trauma associated with a child's testimony in front
of the defendant have two serious identifiable consequences: They may cause psycho-
logical injury to the child, and they may so overwhelm the child as to prevent the
possibility of effective testimony, thereby undermining the truth-finding function of
the trial itself.. . . [A] State properly may consider the protection of child witnesses to
be an important public policy." (footnote omitted)).
45 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
46 Id. at 849 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63).
47 Id. at 845 ("The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the
reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous
testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.").
48 Id. at 847.
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frontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to
further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the
testimony is otherwise assured."4 9 O'Connor specifically wrote that
the "combined effect" of a witness's physical presence, taking of the
oath, submission to cross-examination, and the availability of
demeanor evidence to the jury ensured reliability absent face-to-face
confrontation.5 0 As long as the defense "'is given the full and fair
opportunity to probe and expose [testimonial] infirmities [such as
forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion] through cross-examination,"' the
Confrontation Clause is "'generally satisfied."' 5 1
Because the Clause is not absolute, significant public policy inter-
ests may overcome the confrontation right, although the "requisite
finding of necessity must ... be a case-specific one." 5 2 Further, excep-
tions to the right must still guarantee the reliability of the evidence in
question through the seriousness of the oath, cross-examination, and
the fact-finder's ability to observe the demeanor of the witness.5 3 The
significance of Craig is that it allows exceptions for significant public
policy interests, to the preference for face-to-face confrontation, by
recognizing that demanding a potentially traumatic confrontation
would undermine the reliability goals of the Confrontation Clause. 5 4
It also characterizes the confrontation right in terms of cross-examina-
tion, thereby allowing exceptions so long as the defendant can legiti-
mately examine the witness.5 5
49 Id. at 850 (emphasis added). If reliability can be assured and the witness is
subject to "rigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that
accorded live, in-person testimony," then the procedure probably satisfies the consti-
tutional right. Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
50 Id. at 846, 851.
51 Id. at 847 (alterations in original) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 69).
52 Id. at 855. The Court noted that the trial court must find that the witness will
be traumatized by the presence of the defendant. Id. at 856. This leaves room for
judges to exercise discretion, thereby broadening the possibility of granting an
exemption. Beckett, supra note 31, at 1641 ("By not creating an objective test, Justice
O'Connor opened the door for emotions and social opinion to weigh heavily in the
decision of whether or not an issue constitutes a pertinent public policy. By providing
the opportunity for judges to follow their hearts instead of their minds, Justice
O'Connor has left the labeling of exceptions wide open." (footnote omitted)).
53 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 857.
54 See id. ("Indeed, where face-to-face confrontation causes significant emotional
distress in a child witness, there is evidence that such confrontation would in fact
disserve the Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking goal.").
55 See Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser. Ancient and
Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481, 483 (1994).
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B. The Free Exercise Clause, General Applicability,
and Religious Exemptions
American constitutional history is a seesaw when it comes to relig-
ious accommodations5 6 and scholars disagree about whether the Free
Exercise Clause should require religious exemptions. Professor
Michael McConnell highlights the fact that early state constitutions
allowed for liberty of conscience provided that it did not interfere
with good and peaceable order.5 7 He also points out that James
Madison was more amenable to religious exemptions if they did not
conflict with private rights.58 On the contrary, Professor Philip
Hamburger argues that early Americans did not support a general
right of religious exemption, although they may have allowed accom-
modations in a few specific situations: "Although some dissenters
asked for grants of exemption from a few specified civil obligations,
such as military service, dissenters typically did not demand a general
exemption from objectionable civil laws, let alone a constitutional
right to such an exemption." 59
The Supreme Court waffled between each approach for more
than a century before attempting to settle the exemption question in
Employment Division v. Smith.6 0 The Court scrapped individual case-by-
case analysis of burdens and state interests61 for a presumption of con-
56 See generally, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (discussing the
criminal prohibition against polygamy); People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. June
14, 1813), reprinted in 1 W.L.J. 109 (1843) (discussing the priest-penitent privilege).
Scholars disagree about early American sentiment toward religious exemptions. See
Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspec-
tive, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 915, 932-33 (1992) (arguing that early Americans did not
assume that the Free Exercise Clause granted a general right of religious exemption);
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Relig-
ion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1439-42 (1990) (discussing how Madison's jurisdictional
distinction between church and state and state constitutional provisions acknowledges
the possibility of viable religious accommodation).
57 See McConnell, supra note 56, at 1462 ("[T]he state provisions make sense only
if free exercise envisions religiously compelled exemptions from at least some gener-
ally applicable laws.").
58 Id. at 1463 n.267 (discussing how Madison saw religion as immune from gov-
ernment unless it trespassed on private rights).
59 Hamburger, supra note 56, at 944-45; see also id. at 939 ("The assumption that
religious liberty would not, or at least should not, affect civil authority over civil mat-
ters was so widely held that a general right of religious exemption rarely became the
basis for serious controversy.").
60 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
61 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1972) (allowing exemption for
Amish schoolchildren from mandatory public school attendance law under the Sher-
bert test); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963) (performing a two-part
2010) 1737
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stitutionality concerning neutral and generally applicable laws. Neu-
tral and generally applicable laws that incidentally affect or burden
religious practices are presumptively constitutional. 6 2 Significantly,
the Court preferred that the political process afford religious exemp-
tions instead of the judiciary.6 3 Hence, the Free Exercise Clause
neither compels nor requires religious exemptions from generally
applicable laws, including criminal statutes and constitutional provi-
sions. The Confrontation Clause, on its face, is a neutral and gener-
ally applicable constitutional provision. It does not discriminate
against or target religious practice. Specifically, the existence of the
confrontation right, afforded by the Sixth Amendment, incidentally
burdens the wearer of the veil, thereby fitting neatly into the Smith
framework.
Nevertheless, Smith did leave room for exemptions in a few
areas. 64 Most importantly, the Court acknowledged that the State
might need to justify refusing to extend exemptions to religious
believers if it grants other exemptions to the law in question. This has
remarkable implications regarding possible Confrontation Clause
exemptions for child abuse victims. For example, because Iowa
granted an exemption for child abuse victims as witnesses, Smith sug-
gests that the state must have a compelling interest for denying a simi-
lar exemption to the Muslim woman wearing the veil. As a Third
Circuit judge, Justice Samuel Alito expressed similar reasoning in Fra-
ternal Order of Police v. City of Newark,65 in which the Third Circuit held
that a police department violated the Free Exercise Clause rights of
two Muslim agents when it enforced a policy banning beards and
refused to extend an exemption to the agents despite granting medi-
cal exemptions to the policy. 66 Judge Alito wrote that the police
department's "decision to provide medical exemptions while refusing
analysis to determine whether state law imposed a burden on an individual's religious
beliefs and, if so, whether a compelling state interest existed to supersede that
burden).
62 Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
63 See id. at 890 ("It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government
must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs.").
64 Smith does not apply to the regulation of belief, religious speech, parents'
rights to control education, employment compensation, individualized assessments,
or internal church matters. See id. at 877.
65 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
66 Id. at 365-66.
1738 (VOL. 85-4
CONFRONTING RELIGION
religious exemptions [was] sufficiently suggestive of discriminatory
intent" to trigger heightened scrutiny under Smith.67 Affording a sec-
ular exemption but not a religious one is the basis for heightened
scrutiny despite the otherwise generally applicable law.6 8 In other
words, "when the government makes a value judgment in favor of sec-
ular motivations, but not religious motivations, the government's
actions must survive heightened scrutiny."69 Hence, the Muslim wit-
ness might argue for heightened scrutiny and a religious exemption
because child abuse victims received a secular accommodation.
A governmental interest underlying a law is compelling if it is
stronger than the interest connected to the religious exemption and
granting the exemption will undermine the efficacy of the law.70 One
way to apply this standard is by analyzing the effect of granting multi-
ple religious exemptions.7 1 The strength of the case for an exemption
corresponds to whether granting it will have a negligible or minimal
effect on the administration, enforcement, and viability of the law.
Further, it is important to note that such analysis usually involves com-
pelling state interests. This has significant implications for the present
inquiry because the Confrontation Clause primarily implicates the
interest of the criminal defendant, although the state certainly has an
interest in the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.72 For exam-
ple, it might be argued that under Smith, the Court only takes into
consideration the relevant state interests. However, because height-
ened scrutiny acknowledges the nature of the interest and the effect of
granting exemptions on the efficacy of the law, the latter consideration
likely includes the rights of the criminal defendant because the Con-
67 Id. at 365.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 366. The court ultimately applied intermediate scrutiny because the
police department failed to pass even that standard. Id. at 366 n.7.
70 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1982) ("[T]he Government's
interest in assuring mandatory and continuous participation in and contribution to
the social security system is very high.").
71 See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
435 (2006) ("[T]he Government can demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform
application of a particular program by offering evidence that granting the requested
religious accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to administer the
program.").
72 See supra notes 10-17, 23-26 and accompanying text.
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frontation Clause affords private rights.7 3 In other words, state inter-
ests and private interests often overlap.74
III. POSSIBLE ROOM FOR AN EXEMPTION IN CURRENT
SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE
Current doctrine makes granting the proposed exemption plausi-
ble for a few reasons. First, the Court characterizes the confrontation
right as preferential rather than absolute.75 This opens any decision
involving the confrontation right to judicial discretion. Second, the
witness can argue that protecting religious liberty interests amounts to
a "significant public policy" under Craig. Third, the witness might
claim that when states allow secular exemptions for witnesses the law
must survive heightened scrutiny.76 This last argument is perhaps the
witness's strongest because she can question the validity of the pre-
mise that demeanor evidence is crucial to maintaining reliability.
Finally, consistently wearing the veil might implicate privacy rights.
A. Significance of Preferential v. Absolute Right
Craig grants judicial discretion to trial courts concerning the con-
frontation right. The trial court must find, on a case-by-case basis, that
necessity justifies the exemption.77 First, the exemption must impli-
cate the welfare of the particular witness.78 Second, the court must
73 Lee sheds light on this point; the Court acknowledged the necessity of citizen
participation in order to reach the goals of the social security system. See Lee, 455 U.S.
at 258-59. Granting religious exemptions, which could be numerous, would impose
severe costs on fellow citizens: "[I]t would be difficult to accommodate the compre-
hensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of
religious beliefs." Id. at 259-60. If Smith only guaranteed consideration of state inter-
ests, then a court would never consider the costs of granting exemptions on other
individuals. This would probably strengthen the Muslim witness's case. However,
courts have consistently considered such costs, either individually or as part of the
overall state interest. See Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RERA Revision
of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 76-83 (1996) (discussing balancing as a
free exercise doctrine).
74 Indeed, both the state and the criminal defendant have a strong interest in
maintaining a reliable and credible criminal justice system. See supra notes 10-17,
23-26 and accompanying text.
75 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990).
76 This analysis would occur in the same vein as Fraternal Order ofPolice. See discus-
sion infra Part III.C.
77 Craig, 497 U.S. at 855.
78 Id. ("The trial court must. . . determine whether use of the [proposed] proce-




find that the witness will be traumatized by the presence of the defen-
dant.79 Third, the court "must find that the [witness's] emotional dis-
tress . . . is more than de minimis."80
It appears that the veiled witness should have no difficulty passing
the first and third tests, or at least can argue strongly for each. This is
especially true given judicial reluctance to judge the merits or sincer-
ity of religious practices for individual believers.81 Forcing the witness
to unveil has major implications for her welfare, and as Muhammad
expressed, might cause severe emotional distress. The event could be
traumatizing, especially considering that the believer may perceive
removal of her veil as an attack on both her religion and her dignity.82
This is because veiling "may be for the fulfillment of a religious obliga-
tion, cultural practice, or as a symbol of political conviction."83 Craig
held that the method of exemption must be necessary to protect the
witness's welfare. Allowing a witness to retain her veil is analogous to
shielding the child witness from viewing the defendant because both
correspond to the root of the potential trauma. The potential trauma
suffered is more than general nervousness concerning offering testi-
mony; it is a product of religious concerns-involving personal beliefs
concerning sin and punishment-which is in the same vein as the
child witness's fear of viewing the defendant.
79 Id. at 856.
80 Id. The Court defined the standard for emotional distress as "more than 'mere
nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify.'" Id. (quoting Wildermuth
v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (Md. 1987)).
81 The Court has been wary to define religion and deferential to individual con-
science. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1970) (plurality opinion)
(allowing moral and ethical beliefs to be characterized as "religious"); United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187-88 (1965) (holding that religious belief in some "Supreme
Being" satisfied the test for conscientious objectors); see also Note, Toward a Constitu-
tional Definition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1056, 1066 (1978) (" Torcaso, Seeger, and
Welsh suggest a willingness, in contexts raising free exercise questions, to adopt an
expansive definition of religion.").
82 See generally THE MUSLIM VEIL, supra note 18 (explaining that some women view
the veil as an expression of their individual identity or fidelity to their belief system).
The Qur'an states: "0' (Our) Prophet (Muhammed)! Say thou unto thy wives and thy
daughters and the women of the believers that they let down upon them their cover
garments . . . ." Qur'an 33:8 (S.V. Mir Ahmed Ali et al. trans., 2009). Finally, it also
advises "believing women . . . display not their adornment . . . ." Id. 24:31.
83 Steven R. Houchin, Comment, Confronting the Shadow: Is Forcing a Muslim Wit-
ness to Unveil in a Criminal Trial a Constitutional Right, or an Unreasonable Intrusion ? 36
PEPP. L. REv. 823, 834 (2009) (footnotes omitted). Ginnnah Muhammad sacrificed
her right to sue, perhaps unwittingly, due to her religious beliefs. See Transcript of
Small Claims Hearing, supra note 1, at 6.
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However, the second finding is more problematic. Craig specifi-
cally instructs that a trial court "must also find that the child witness
would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the
presence of the defendant."84 The presence of the defendant must
cause the trauma. This means that "if the state interest were merely
the interest in protecting child witnesses from courtroom trauma gen-
erally, denial of face-to-face confrontation would be unnecessary
because the child could be permitted to testify in less intimidating
surroundings, albeit with the defendant present."85 This is problem-
atic because the veiled witness is probably more traumatized by
unveiling in the courtroom generally rather than specifically in front
of the defendant. Indeed, the defendant is only one small part of the
larger audience that is the source of the trauma due to exposure.
This suggests that the veiled witness's trauma is not solely a result of
the defendant's presence, which is the basis of granting exemptions to
child abuse victims. There could be a case in which the trauma suf-
fered is mostly due to the defendant. The Court left the door open for
a finding of necessity in such a case by holding that the right is prefer-
ential and by granting trial courts wide judicial discretion.
B. Religious Liberty as a "Significant Public Policy"
Craig involved Maryland's statutory procedure, which prevented
the child witness from seeing the defendant while testifying.86 A
majority of states had similar or analogous procedures at the time. 7
Craig applies in all federal courts and in thirty-four states with consti-
tutional provisions that parallel the Confrontation Clause.88 Further,
the Court emphasized that Maryland's procedure ensured other fac-
tors in favor of reliability.89 Nevertheless, the critical inquiry was
whether the procedure furthered an important state interest.90
84 Craig, 497 U.S. at 856.
85 Id.
86 See id. at 851 ("Maryland's statutory procedure, when invoked, prevents a child
witness from seeing the defendant as he or she testifies against the defendant at
trial.").
87 See id. at 853.
88 Houchin, supra note 83, at 848.
89 Craig, 497 U.S. at 851 ("Maryland's procedure preserves all of the other ele-
ments of the confrontation right: The child witness must be competent to testify and
must testify under oath; the defendant retains full opportunity for contemporaneous
cross-examination; and the judge,jury, and defendant are able to view (albeit by video
monitor) the demeanor (and body) of the witness as he or she testifies.").
90 See id. at 852.
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Craig cited past decisions sustaining legislation aimed at protect-
ing the psychological and physical well being of child abuse victims.91
Multiple cases involved the clash of constitutional interests. For exam-
ple, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk County,9 2 the
Court found that the state's interest in the well being of minor victims
justified depriving both the press and the public of their right to
attend criminal trials.93 The physical and psychological well being of
child abuse victims trumped the constitutional rights of others given
unique factual circumstances. The Court noted that multiple states
had similar statutes, thereby proving its significance as a state inter-
est.9 4 Specifically, Maryland intended "'to safeguard the physical and
psychological well-being of child victims by avoiding, or at least mini-
mizing, the emotional trauma produced by testifying.'" 9 5 Further,
Craig highlighted the "State's traditional and 'transcendent interest in
protecting the welfare of children.' "'9 6 It cited academic literature
concerning the trauma suffered by child abuse victims. 9 7 Signifi-
cantly, the Court refused to second-guess the Maryland legislature.98
This reasoning allows the veiled witness to make several argu-
ments that religious liberty amounts to a significant public policy. At
the most basic level, unveiling implicates the psychological and physi-
cal well being of the Muslim woman.99 Religious expression cuts to
the very core of human dignity, and as Muhammad stated, unveiling
would lead to major shame and embarrassment.100 There is wide-
spread literature on the significance of the veil to demonstrate the
91 Id. ("We have of course recognized that a State's interest in 'the protection of
minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment' is a 'compel-
ling' one." (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk County, 457
U.S. 596, 607 (1982))).
92 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
93 See id. at 608-09; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (upholding a
statute proscribing the possession of child pornography against an individual's right
to free speech).
94 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 853.
95 Id. at 854 (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 286 (Md. 1987)).
96 Id. at 855 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968)).
97 Id. at 854.
98 Id. at 855 ("[W]e will not second-guess the considered judgment of the Mary-
land Legislature regarding the importance of its interest in protecting child abuse
victims from the emotional trauma of testifying.").
99 See THE MUSLIM VEIL, supra note 18, at 115-16.
100 Transcript of Small Claims Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 ("Ginnnah Muhammad:
'Well, first of all, I'm a practicing Muslim and this is my way of life and I believe in the
Holy Koran and God is first in my life. I don't have a problem with taking my veil off
if it's a female judge, so I want to know do you have a female that I could be in front
of then I have no problem but otherwise, I can't follow that order.'").
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psychological effect of having victims face their supposed abuser. 01
Nevertheless, her strongest argument probably lies in the vast history
of religious exemptions granted through the political process by legis-
latures that often cite the protection of religious liberty as a state inter-
est. Some Founders thought that the State had an interest in
protecting religious belief.102 The Court also affirmatively deferred to
the judgment of the Maryland legislature; political communities that
recognize the significance of religious practices may be afforded the
same level of deference. This deference, coupled with the Court's
openness to individualized assessments on a case-by-case basis, affords
judges ample discretion to determine the immediate effects of accom-
modation on the trial at hand.
C. State Secular Accommodation, Heightened Scrutiny, Reliability,
and Demeanor Evidence
Smith left open the possibility of exceptions to generally applica-
ble laws. Fraternal Order ofPolice v. City of Newark found room for relig-
ious exemptions when such laws provide secular exceptions. 03 This
has major implications for the veiled witness, especially because so
many states have granted secular accommodations for child abuse vic-
tims. Allowing accommodations based on secular reasons but not
religious ones triggers heightened scrutiny. 04 Further, the Religious
101 See generally THE MUSLIM VEIL, supra note 18 (discussing the moral, cultural,
and interpersonal implications of veiling).
102 John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Consti-
tutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 371, 386 (1996) ("[C]ivic republicans
sought to imbue the public square with a common religious ethic and ethos-albeit
one less denominationally specific and rigorous than that countenanced by the Puri-
tans."). As Professor Witte notes, George Washington once declared, "'Religion and
Morality are the essential pillars of Civil society.'" Id. (quoting Letter from George
Washington to the Clergy of Different Denominations Residing In and Near the City
of Philadelphia (Mar. 3, 1797), in 36 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON,
1745-1799, at 416 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931)).
103 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text; see also Rader v. Johnston, 924 F.
Supp. 1540, 1555 (D. Neb. 1996) (holding that a state university did not have a com-
pelling state interest in diverse freshmen housing and that the housing policy was not
being enforced in a neutral manner). The Religious Freedom and Restoration Act
(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006), because it restores heightened scrutiny under
federal law, would lead to the same analysis given that the Sixth Amendment is part of
the federal Constitution. See id.
104 Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 1999)
("[W]hen the government makes a value judgment in favor of secular motivations,




Freedom and Restoration Act' 0 5 (RFRA) restored the pre-Smith
exemption analysis, as articulated in Sherbert, to federal laws.106 Thus,
the veiled witness needs to show that the policy behind the Confronta-
tion Clause, namely reliability, fails to outweigh her individual liberty
interest and that granting a religious exemption would not seriously
undermine the efficacy of the provision. 0 7
As mentioned above, the Court consistently acknowledges relia-
bility and fairness as the linchpin of the confrontation right.
Demeanor evidence, as viewed by the defendant, defense counsel, and
the judge and jury, is thought essential to ensuring a credible, relia-
ble, and fair criminal proceeding in pursuit of both truth and jus-
tice.108 Indeed, reliance on this assumption, namely the necessity of
demeanor evidence, pervades the criminal justice system:
The weight given to non-verbal expression in jury instructions, the
appellate courts' limited review because of its inability to perceive
them, juror disqualification because of an inability to view these
expressions, and prejudice resulting from judges' inappropriate use
of them all demonstrate the dilemma created by a witness wearing a
niqab. 09
Hence, it appears that the best way to question the strength of the
purported state interest under heightened scrutiny is to demonstrate
that demeanor evidence is not as necessary to judge the reliability of
witness testimony as originally believed.
There are three reasons why the veiled witness might claim that
the state interest is less than compelling. First, it is not clear that all
types of demeanor evidence must be made available for adequate fact-
finding to occur. Demeanor evidence consists of nonverbal cues and
105 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
106 Id. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)-(2).
107 See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
108 See supra notes 29-55 and accompanying text; see also People v. Sammons, 478
N.W.2d 901, 910 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that masking of the prosecution's
chief witness during his testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because the trier
of fact could not evaluate the witness's demeanor); Romero v. State, 173 S.W.3d 502,
506-07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (finding that obstruction of a witness's face by a dis-
guise of sunglasses, a baseball cap, and a turned-up collar violated the defendant's
confrontation right); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DisTucr COURT
JUDGEs §§ 2.07, 7.04, at 102, 226-27 (5th ed. 2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Benchbk5.pdf/$file/Benchbk5.pdf (advising judges to
instruct criminal juries of their duty to assess the credibility and demeanor of
witnesses).
109 Aaron J. Williams, Comment, The Veiled Truth: Can the Credibility of Testimony
Given by a Niqab-Wearing Witness be Judged Without the Assistance of Facial Expressions?, 85
U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 273, 278 (2008).
2010] 1745
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
contributes to one person's absorption of information communicated
by another person.110 Many commentators believe that this form of
communication contributes significantly to the trier of fact's ability to
assess credibility because "[g]estures and facial expressions are trans-
mitted and observed by every individual in the courtroom.... A wit-
ness on the stand, under the scrutiny of the jury, reveals more
through fidgeting with his clothes and shifting his body than he does
through his testimony.""' But is this true?
Common sense and scientific research indicate that verbal and
nonverbal communications deserve equal consideration. Evaluating
the veracity of testimony focuses on verbal responses to questions and
the consistency of statements.112 At the same time, both shared expe-
rience and scientific research tell us that facial expressions and other
nonverbal expressions do not always follow verbal representations."
But most important to this inquiry is whether fact-finders can actually
perceive such discrepancies. Scientific research casts doubt on the
proposition that individuals can determine when they are being lied
to through nonverbal expressions.114 Further, the ability to even per-
ceive such expressions is "inaccurate at best."" 5 One study found that
judges only detected untruthfulness approximately fifty-seven percent
110 SeeJeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of
Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1164 (1993)
(discussing the operational definitions of demeanor, including external appearances
and physical cues); Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1075, 1078
(1991) (discussing three categories of "cues" that comprise demeanor in the law);
Martin S. Remland, The Importance of Nonverbal Communication in the Courtroom
4 (Apr. 29, 1993) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/
ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content-storage_01/0000019b/80/13/96/b7.pdf.
111 Elizabeth A. LeVan, Nonverbal Communication in the Courtroom: Attorney Beware, 8
LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 83, 83-84 (1984).
112 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 108, § 7.04, at 226-27.
113 See Remland, supra note 110, at 6; SharonJayson, It's Written All over Your Face,
USA TODAY, July 21, 2005, at 9D.
114 See Paul Ekman & Maureen O'Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOL-
OGIST 913, 914 (1991). See generally Bella M. DePaulo & Roger L. Pfeifer, On-the-job
Experience and Skill at Detecting Deception, 16J. APPUED Soc. PSYCHOL. 249 (1986) (deter-
mining that individuals were generally unable to accurately perceive deceptive
communication).
115 Williams, supra note 109, at 284 (citing Ekman & O'Sullivan, supra note 114, at
913); see also Blumenthal, supra note 110, at 1159 (1993) ("[S]tudies establish that
typical subjects are unable to use the manner and conduct of a speaker to successfully
detect deceptive information on any reliable basis." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Wellborn, supra note 110, at 1075 (noting that "social scientists have tested the
legal premise concerning demeanor" and "the experimental results indicate that this
legal premise is erroneous").
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of the time' 1 6-a particularly glaring statistic. Thus, the questionable
ability of fact-finders to determine the truth of statements uttered in
court based upon demeanor or nonverbal expressions renders the
rationale underlying removal of the veil questionable at the very
least.1 17 As one commentator puts it: "If a fact finder's ability to ascer-
tain deceit through nonverbal communication is slightly greater than
fifty percent, how compelling is the court's interest in requiring a wit-
ness to remove her veil, especially when the only nonverbal cues
inhibited by the niqab are facial expressions?"' 18 This is especially
true given that some studies suggest that nonverbal and nonfacial cues
are better indicators of untruthfulness than facial expressions.119
Such cues are also easier to perceive. 120 Simply put, given the percep-
tiveness of juries, a witness's tone of voice, body language, and verbal
testimony may be just as important and even sufficient to convey his or
her credibility .
Further, the elements outlined by Justice O'Connor in Craig that
support reliability should be considered. The witness would still take
an oath.121 Also, the presence of the veil does not wholly preclude a
face-to-face meeting. The majority in Coy and Craig, as well as Justice
Scalia's dissent in Craig, emphasized the importance of face-to-face
confrontation. However, neither opinion offered explanation about
the exact meaning of face-to-face. In fact, if confronted by a witness in
a veil, the defendant retains the ability to look into her eyes.122
116 Ekman & O'Sullivan, supra note 114, at 916. It should also be noted that,
unlike juries, judges are professional.
117 See Blumenthal, supra note 110, at 1190-95 (discussing disconnect between
behaviors thought to indicate deception and those actually observed); Williams, supra
note 109, at 286 ("The common idea held by many, that one has the ability to detect
deception based on the facial expressions of another, appears to be largely incorrect.
Although most research suggests that many forms of nonverbal communication pro-
vide indicators of untruthfulness, when focusing on facial expressions perception
appears to be the problem." (footnote omitted)).
118 Williams, supra note 109, at 288.
119 See generally LeVan, supra note 111 (discussing the effects of nonverbal commu-
nication on the judge, witness, client, and attorney).
120 See Ekman & O'Sullivan, supra note 114, at 914.
121 See Houchin, supra note 83, at 860-61 ("[T]he veil .. . does not prevent a
witness from testifying under oath.... [T] he seriousness of the matter and the possi-
bility of the penalty of pejury are still impressed upon the veiled witness .... The
fulfillment of the oath element weighs toward reliability." (footnote omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
122 But see Houchin, supra note 83, at 858 ("The literal 'face-to-face' aspect of con-
frontation is undoubtedly compromised when a witness's face is covered to the extent
that only a small portion is visible."). "Confront" is defined as "to stand face to face
with." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 477 (1986).
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Finally, the veil does not directly inhibit cross-examination, although
one commentator suggests that the inability to observe demeanor
entirely precludes a legitimate opportunity for comprehensive cross-
examination.123 However, the defendant retains the ability to ques-
tion the witness extensively, thereby eliciting responses to questions,
exposing inconsistent statements, and showing hesitation in responses
and changes in nonfacial body language. Strict observation is unnec-
essary to uncover doubt, hesitation, lack of confidence, and even lies;
this information is the product of verbal responses as well. 124 It is true
that the veil might cover "tiny signals revealed in facial expres-
sions."125 But given that individuals have severe difficulty detecting
such signals or their meaning, 126 this justification demands reevalua-
tion at the very least and cannot stand alone.
That demeanor evidence remains available indicates that the veil
might not undercut reliability or cross-examination as much as origi-
nally thought. Many individuals have difficulty accurately perceiving
and judging the veracity of nonverbal cues. Furthermore, facial
expressions are not always dispositive when it comes to demeanor and
it is possible that nonfacial body language is actually more indicative
of truthfulness. At the very least, this research should spur reconsider-
ation of the idea that the need for physical demeanor evidence is suffi-
cient justification for forcing the witness to unveil.
D. Does the Muslim Witness Have a Privacy Interest in Her Face?
One author suggests that the witness maintains privacy rights sup-
plemental to the general free exercise interest.127 Individuals enjoy a
reasonable expectation of privacy if a person exhibits an actual and
subjective expectation of privacy and society is prepared to recognize
the expectation as reasonable. 128 The veiled woman would have to
claim an expectation of privacy in her face; however, multiple courts
have denied such an expectation with respect to voices, handwriting,
123 See Houchin, supra note 83, at 861 ("[L]egal commentators have identified the
ability to assess a witness's expression and general demeanor as an important part of
the truth finding process in cross-examination.").
124 See id. at 862. But cf Jack B. Swerling, "I Can't Believe I Asked That Question": A
Look at Cross-Examination Techniques, 50 S.C. L. REV. 753, 777 (1999) (advising cross-
examiners to "not take [their] eyes off the witness," because "[t]he eyes reveal many
secrets and conceal very little").
125 See Houchin, supra note 83, at 862.
126 See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
127 See Oren, supra note 21, at 868.
128 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
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hands, and eyes. 129 One's voice is "constantly exposed to the pub-
lic"130 and with handwriting "nothing is exposed to the grand jury that
has not previously been exposed to the public."131 However, a woman
that chooses to cover her face daily and in public would seem to fall
outside of this public exposure category because the particular physi-
cal attribute is not ordinarily in plain view.13 2 A veiled Muslim woman
seeks to preserve her face as private, thereby heightening an expecta-
tion of privacy.133 Hence, any court would need to determine
whether she has an expectation of privacy in her unexposed physical
features.13 4
It remains unclear whether society would recognize this privacy
expectation as reasonable, especially on the witness stand. Expecta-
tions related to social customs have been found reasonable if they
contribute to societal values. 13 5 It is at least arguable that society not
only recognizes religious garments as reasonable, but that it also
believes they contribute positively to the propagation of societal val-
ues, such as freedom of religion.1 3 6 However, this prong of the Katz
test may be problematic for one apparent reason: the reasonableness
of the expectation of privacy and the subsequent search are within the
129 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (voice); United States v.
Doe, 457 F.2d 895, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1972) (handwriting samples); United States v.
Richardson, 388 F.2d 842, 845 (6th Cir. 1968) (hands); State v. Shearer, 30 P.3d 995,
1000 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (eyes).
130 Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14.
131 Doe, 457 F.2d at 899. In Shearer, the Idaho court spoke of eyes as a "facial
characteristic that is ordinarily and frequently exposed to the public." Shearer, 30 P.3d
at 1000.
132 See Oren, supra note 21, at 882, 894 ("[I]t is possible that a court may conclude
that a veiled Muslim woman whose face has not been exposed to the public has an
actual expectation of privacy in her face.").
133 See id. at 894.
134 The veiled Muslim woman may be analogous to the "rare recluse" who could
have an expectation of privacy in normally exposed physical attributes. See Doe, 457
F.2d at 898; see also Oren, supra note 21, at 883 ("Because no court has ever ruled on
whether there is a privacy interest in the case of a person who regularly keeps private
a physical feature freely exposed by the general population, such a case would be one
of first impression in the United States.").
135 See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) ("When a bus passenger
places a bag in an overhead bin, he expects that other passengers or bus employees
may move it for one reason or another."); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990)
("Staying overnight in another's home is a longstanding social custom that serves
functions recognized as valuable in society.").
136 See generally President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Islamic Center of Wash-
ington (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=63740 (discussing how Muslim women who wear head coverings should be
treated with respect).
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context of a criminal proceeding. Here the Court's decision in Hud-
son v. Palmer37 is illuminating: Although prisoners retained a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy in their cells, society was not prepared to
recognize it as reasonable given "the concept of incarceration and the
needs and objectives of penal institutions."'1 3 8 In Hudson, the larger
institutional concern outweighed the privacy interest of the individ-
ual. Criminal trials and the integrity of the criminal justice system
arguably are analogous.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH GRANTING THE EXEMPTION
Despite the openings making an exemption plausible, there are
strong reasons, born from legal, historical, and normative considera-
tions, for denying the exemption. As mentioned above, the tradi-
tional test for heightened scrutiny does not neatly fit the situation
given that affording an exemption will have a direct impact on
another's constitutional interest rather than individual or societal inter-
ests in the aggregate.139 Second, although the reliability of demeanor
evidence might be suspect in some situations, its mere existence serves
as a baseline of fairness for the criminal defendant and contributes to
overall faith in the criminal justice system. Third, embedded within
the American psyche is a belief in the power and value of confronta-
tion and the adversarial system, both inside and outside of the legal
realm, for procuring truth. 140 Related to this belief is a strong pre-
sumption in favor of protecting individuals against raw government
power, which is reflected in the numerous protections afforded crimi-
137 468 U.S. 517 (1984). In Hudson, the Court held that American society is not
prepared to recognize the privacy rights of prisoners in their cells. Id. at 536.
138 Id. at 526. But see Lupu, supra note 19, at 203 (noting that RFRA overruled
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), thereby subjecting institutions, such as
prisons, to pre-Smith standards).
139 Cf United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1982) (declining to extend a
statutory exemption to the social security program for self-employed Amish to Amish
employers). The proposed exemption differs from Lee, because even had the exemp-
tion been granted, the cost of losing one taxpayer did not directly and immediately
impact the vitality of the system, whereas allowing veiled testimony might have signifi-
cant consequences for the individual defendant. Further, entitlement benefits are a
matter of statutory law rather than a constitutional guarantee. See id.
140 See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative
History, 27 RUTGERs L.J. 77, 94-116 (1995). According to Professor Jonakait, "Ameri-
can adversary procedure with defense cross-examination at its core furthered such
rights by acting as a check on the government and by granting the citizenry control
over their lives." Id. at 113. "[T]he right to confrontation was guaranteeing an
accused the right to cross-examine witnesses as part of the adversary system that had
emerged." Id. at 115.
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nal defendants. Finally, in a society with scattered resources for pro-
moting and protecting liberty, it is more logical to allocate such
resources to the party with the most to lose.
Heightened scrutiny in the free exercise context normally bal-
ances the burden on free exercise with state interests, which must be
compelling in order to deny the exemption. 141 Courts normally
acknowledge public policy objectives, aggregate individual interests,
and broader societal interests born from history or culture when cal-
culating how compelling the case is for denying the exemption from
the generally applicable law at issue. Undeniably this analysis may
occur in the situation at hand; the state interest, namely a fair and
reliable criminal justice system, competes with the individual free
exercise interest of the Muslim witness. It is at least plausible to make
the argument that the witness should prevail given possible doubts
about the veil's effect on the reliability of demeanor evidence and its
significance for guaranteeing a fair trial. However, in the case at
hand, the free exercise interest must be balanced against both the
relevant state and individual interests, which admittedly overlap for
the most part. The major difference is that the Confrontation Clause
is a constitutional liberty interest that can be directly and immediately
affected if an exemption is allowed.
There are no heightened scrutiny cases on record attempting to
choose between the free exercise interest and another individual con-
stitutional interest. 142 In Lee, the Court highlighted that granting
exemptions could undermine the individual statutory rights of citi-
zens entitled to social security benefits.143 While Lee is distinguishable
on its face because it involved statutory interests, it is informative
because the Court took seriously such individual interests and com-
bined them with the overall interest of the state in a healthy and work-
able social security system. The costs of granting exemptions on other
individuals were too high to allow the exemption, even when they
were attenuated given the vastness of the entitlement system. The
same can occur here, although the aggregation is unnecessary
because the interest in confrontation is constitutional rather than stat-
utory and the consequences are immediate rather than systemic. The
state interest in assuring fair and reliable criminal proceedings com-
141 See supra Parts II.B, III.C.
142 Lee involves statutory entitlement benefits. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 259-60 (finding
that the social security tax payment requirement was applicable to Amish employers
despite their objection because of the government's overriding interest in preserving
social security system).
143 See id. at 258-59.
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bines with the individual constitutional liberty interest of the defen-
dant to justify burdening the veiled witness.
Second, although demeanor evidence may be unreliable in some
situations, this possibility alone does not justify granting an exemp-
tion. It is impossible to know and anticipate when and how much
jurors will rely on demeanor evidence in any given trial. Put simply,
demeanor evidence serves as another piece of information for the
jury, and others in the courtroom, to include in its decisionmaking
process. The availability of such evidence serves as a baseline of infor-
mation guaranteed to everyone in the courtroom. This sort of
rational deliberation should be promoted, especially in a criminal jus-
tice system that prioritizes the rule of law. Further, not only does the
presence of such information promote fairness in fact, it also pro-
motes a perception of fairness, which is arguably equally significant. 144
Perhaps most importantly, granting an exemption on reliability
grounds continues the trend of converting the confrontation right
afforded the defendant into a rule of evidence rather than a viable
constitutional interest.145
There are also historical and normative considerations to take
into account. Most scholars agree that although the Framers' specific
understanding of the Confrontation Clause is ambiguous, there are
ample sources tracing its history almost two thousand years. 146 Early
144 The Confrontation Clause "serves ends related both to appearances and to
reality." Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988); see also PennyJ. White, Rescuing the
Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REV. 537, 614 (2003) ("While confrontation's purpose
is to secure fairness, it must also secure the perception of fairness.").
145 See White, supra note 144, at 618-19 (arguing that the Court has equated relia-
bility with confrontation). This trend arguably began with Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237 (1895), when the Court's decision led to the "unfortunate misjoinder of
evidence principles with the constitutional right to confrontation." White, supra note
144, at 557. The approach has led to judicial inquiries into reliability and effective
cross-examination in order to balance the interests of witnesses and defendants, lead-
ing one commentator to argue "the Supreme Court has redefined the Confrontation
Clause as an element of cross-examination, rather than as a fundamental right."
Beckett, supra note 31, at 1614 (footnote omitted).
146 See, e.g., Herrmann & Speer, supra note 55, at 482-89 (discussing how Roman
law required that the accuser be present in court and that the accused have an oppor-
tunity to encounter the accuser); White, supra note 144, at 540 (noting that while
many people trace the Confrontation Clause's origin to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh
in the early 1660s, "most recognize much earlier beginnings ... and attach the
Clause's origin to ancient civilizations"). Evidence of the importance of confronta-
tion can be found also in religious and literary texts. See, e.g., Acts 25:16 (New Ameri-
can) ("I replied that it was not the Roman practice to hand an accused man over
before he had been confronted with his accusers and given a chance to defend him-
self against their charge."); WIu.IAM SHAKEsPEARE, RIcHARD II, act 1, sc. 1 ("Then call
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Roman law, which required that accusers be present in court, reflects
an accusatorial system analogous to that established by the colonies
and constitutionalized by the United States. 1 47 Both systems empha-
sized the significance of comprehensive cross-examination in the pur-
suit of justice.148 Cross-examination via confrontation was a
significant component of the accusatorial criminal justice system
because it enabled the discovery of truth.14 9  Blackstone, who
informed many of the state constitutions serving as the foundation of
the Sixth Amendment confrontation right, summarized the power of
confrontation:
This open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all
mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than
the private and secret examination taken down in writing before an
officer . ... [T]he persons who are to decide upon the evidence
have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, education, under-
standing, behaviour, and inclinations of the witness .... 150
Behind each of these historical sources is the underlying belief
that those willing to make factual assertions, accusations, or claims
when liberty hangs in the balance cannot do so stealthily. President
Eisenhower's comment quoted in Coy echoes the same idea: a free
and democratic society frowns upon those who "sneak up from
behind." 5 1 In this sense, confrontation is a two-way street: it is both a
right for the defendant and an obligation for the witness.15 2 Thus, the
them to our presence; face to face, [a]nd frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear
[t]he accuser and the accused freely speak . . . .").
147 See Herrmann & Speer, supra note 55, at 484-85; White, supra note 144, at
540-41 ("[T]he American right to confrontation is not an outgrowth of either the
English common law or constitutional law, but is rather a byproduct of the American
adversarial system created by the American colonists.").
148 See Herrmann & Speer, supra note 55, at 488 ("When witnesses were present
... they testified on direct examination and were subject to cross-examination by the
adverse party."); Jonakait, supra note 140, at 81 (noting how state constitutions
emphasized the adversarial system "with defense cross-examination at its core").
Jonakait also writes that "the Sixth Amendment sought to constitutionalize [an]
adversary system" inherited from the colonies. Id. at 108.
149 See Beckett, supra note 31, at 1609 ("[F]rom the very beginning of the Anglo-
American judicial structure, confrontation played a crucial role in determining the
fate of an accused.").
150 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373-74.
151 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. President Eisenhower's remark dem-
onstrates the fact that Americans place faith in an adversarial process that sheds light
on the darkness in order to discover truth. Accusations jeopardizing liberty must
withstand the light of day before they can be considered credible.
152 See Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause,
81 NEB. L. REv. 1258, 1266 (2003) ("The language of the clause itself suggests a wit-
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history of Western civilization indicates a preference for the practice
of looking one's accuser in the eye and reaching resolutions face-to-
face. That confrontation is part of the social ethos cannot be dis-
counted in calculations of perceptions of fairness and reliability and
favors erring on the side of the criminal defendant.' 5 3
Favoring the interests of the criminal defendant is consistent with
the American prioritization of rights against the government and the
modern trend in criminal procedure toward granting defendants
ample protection. 154 As a normative and historical matter, the Ameri-
can scheme prioritizes individual rights before those of govern-
ment. 55 The Clause affords defendants a legitimate tool to
counteract the power of prosecutions on behalf of the government.15 6
Further, criminal defendants are potentially vulnerable members of
society when put against the powers of the state. The law should place
the proper burdens on the government before it severely limits some-
one's liberty, especially when it can take it away for a very long time or
potentially forever. 15 7 And this should be the case even if imposing
such burdens on the government has an incidental effect on the
rights of others. Though costly, affording defendants rights is consis-
tent with American traditions.
Some might charge that this amounts to judging the merits of
religious expression, or unfairly prioritizing some liberties over others
without cause; however, such a result is merely the unfortunate conse-
quence of living under a regime that affords ample liberty interests
without quantifying or ranking their value from the outset. Simply
put, when two constitutional interests conflict, it makes sense to pro-
ness-centered approach. The defendant's right is not 'to confront' but 'to be con-
fronted with' the witnesses against him. The witness is the one who must do the
confronting-who must not 'hide' or 'sneak.'").
153 See Beckett, supra note 31, at 1629 ("The primary goal of a criminal trial is to
determine truth so that the innocent will be acquitted and the guilty will be convicted.
Our society has created many tools for uncovering the truth. One such tool is face-to-
face confrontation. This tool is part of our social ethos . . . ."); supra note 149.
154 JEROLD H. ISRAEL & WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1-9 (2009) (dis-
cussing the "criminal justice revolution" beginning in the second half of the twentieth
century).
155 See White, supra note 144, at 549 ("Government was to be feared, not trusted,
and the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights, in particular, were intended to assure that
government could not encroach upon certain fundamental liberties.").
156 SeeJonakait, supra note 140, at 167 ("Power, including the power of the gov-
ernment in criminal trials, needed to be checked. Confrontation, and the related
rights, as part of the development government of checks-and-balances, affirmatively
gave the accused the power to truly test the prosecution's case.").
157 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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tect the one that implicates the broader purposes of the constitutional
scheme, namely skepticism of government encroachment and protec-
tion against the most dangerous violations of liberty. The fact that
more than one of the amendments in the Bill of Rights addresses the
rights of criminal defendants, and other provisions of the Constitu-
tion touch on criminal procedure, is strong evidence that the Foun-
ders were serious about safeguarding the rights of criminal
defendants who are subject to the whims of the state. No other cate-
gory of rights receives similar repeated treatment in the Constitution.
Although the witness may claim that religious freedom is also consis-
tent with limited government, the displacement in this case of the
right is a result of another compelling constitutional interest rather
than government encroachment. While forcing the witness to unveil
may undermine some successful prosecutions, the temporary loss of
religious liberty does not outweigh the potential loss of significantly
more freedoms due to wrongful conviction. 58
CONCLUSION
There is certainly room in current Supreme Court doctrine for
granting an exemption to the veiled witness. Craig, characterizing the
confrontation right as general and preferential, provides criteria for
allowing significant public policy exceptions, as long as reliability and
cross-examination remain unscathed. It is at least arguable that wear-
ing a veil does not undermine reliability because demeanor evidence
may not be as helpful as originally and historically thought and
because the defendant would retain the ability to cross-examine the
witness. Of course, this argument presumes what science cannot
definitively prove, namely the degree to which jurors, attorneys, and
judges utilize such demeanor evidence. That perception sometimes
fails does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that providing the
most information possible, through demeanor evidence, is unneces-
sary or not worthwhile. Indeed, it would seem that Justice Scalia,
among others, is onto something when he notes that the perception
of fairness is almost as important-if not as important-as fairness
itself. This is especially true given the historical underpinnings of the
confrontation right, namely precluding accusations, cast from behind
158 See White, supra note 144, at 620 ("Adhering to the right of confrontation, just
as adhering to all fundamental constitutional rights, will cause some criminal prosecu-
tions to fail. Its application should not be viewed as a hurdle to efficient, successful
prosecution, but rather as a barrier to unfair, unconfronted convictions. It is not a
rule to be maneuvered around in order to assure more convictions; rather it is a rule
to be demanded in order to guarantee ultimate fairness.").
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a shadow, from taking liberty unjustly. These normative bases under-
lying the confrontation right should not be ignored.
But is there a workable constitutional solution to this problem?
The answer might lie in the fact that the Supreme Court has allowed
both constitutional rights to be subject to exceptions. Religious
exemptions are permissible in some instances but not required in the
case of generally applicable laws, and confrontation is a general right
that might give way in rare situations. I believe there are two possible
avenues given the current pliability of the provisions.
Justice O'Connor's insistence on individualized analysis, regard-
ing the necessity of the exception to the general confrontation right,
seems to be a workable standard, albeit an imperfect one. The ques-
tion of unveiling could occur on a case-by-case basis and be left to the
discretion of trial level judges, although guided by a few factors.159
Judges, when deciding this question, might consider various factors
peculiar to the case at hand: the significance of the particular testi-
mony to the case; the magnitude of the trauma on the witness; the
effect unveiling will have on reliability; and whether the defendant
can truly cross-examine the witness. Exemptions would be nearly
entirely case-specific, and if the witness continues to refuse after being
directed to unveil, the state might just have to lose the witness's testi-
mony and both interests would be protected as a result. The judge
would also remind the jury at the close of the trial to take the testi-
mony, in its entirety, veil or no veil, into consideration. Reviewing
courts could review trial court decisions according to a harmless error
standard in light of other testimony and evidence within the particu-
lar case. Finally, as the number of cases increases, lower-level courts
could look to analogous fact patterns to avoid inconsistent results.160
The alternative is to leave the question to legislatures, as Smith
and Craig seem to advise. Because the Court has refused to cast each
liberty interest as absolute, the legislative process could answer the
question and the courts would show deference to the preference of
159 This balancing approach seems to be consistent with a preferential confronta-
tion right as well as heightened scrutiny for religious exemption questions. See Gress-
man & Carmella, supra note 73, at 78 n.55 ("With Sherbert, balancing became the
normative practice of determining constitutional doctrine.").
160 See id. at 81 (discussing "definitional balancing," which "determines that some
classes of religious claims are presumptively outweighed"). However, this approach is
not without criticism because it often leads to balancing at very abstract levels, thereby
avoiding the particularities of each case, which have real world implications for relig-
ious burdens. See id. at 82 ("[T] he Court evaluates the claimed liberty against social
interests at a high level of generality (and consequent abstractness) in order to pro-
duce a rule directly applicable in future cases without the need to balance.").
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the particular legislature. This avenue is attractive because it places
the decision in the hands of the community.161 At the same time, it
leads to the unfortunate problem of allowing the community, through
legislators, to judge the legitimacy or seriousness of particular relig-
ious practices.1 62 But the legislature could choose to never or always
allow the exemption and even mandate the reading of certain instruc-
tions before the close of trial if the state chooses to use a veiled
witness.
The question of the veiled witness must be taken very seriously in
light of the above considerations and in a post-9/11 world. As more
Muslims become U.S. citizens, entitled to the same religious freedoms
as their fellow Americans, the law must prepare to account for relig-
ious practices that might impact their ability to participate as citizens.
The challenge is to allow such participation within the context of the
constitutional rights of others. At the very least, judges, legislatures,
jurors, and citizens should consider the foregoing analysis when such
decisions have to be made.
161 See McCusker, supra note 22, at 399-400 ("[A] carve-out system has the virtue
of allowing legislators to consider each religious practice and its effects in turn, to see
how dangerous or hostile to civil order it actually is and how often the prohibiting of
the practice would cause the exclusion of religious groups and people from public
life."); see also Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940) ("Judicial
review . . is a fundamental part of our constitutional scheme. But to the legislature
no less than to courts is committed the guardianship of deeply-cherished liberties.")
162 See McCusker, supra note 22, at 400 ("This virtue, though, is also the practice's
weakness: it provides for the sort of discretionary judgment by public officials on the
merits of religious practices that the Court held unconstitutional . . . ."); see also Gress-
man & Carmella, supra note 73, at 74 ("Courts develop and use balancing tests not to
reflect majoritarian accommodations, but to define constitutional principles."). The
politicization of constitutional rights is not always preferable, if ever.
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